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Husserl on Lifeworld and Experiential World
Chung-Chi Yu
Husserl brings up the lifeworld notion in his discourse on overcoming the crisis of European sciences 
that results from the objectivism or naturalism of scientific research. He puts forward the concept of 
experiential world as he works on the foundation for socio-cultural sciences. Both concepts depict how 
the subject is not enclosed in itself, it is instead the subject in the world. Yet the distinction of lifeworld 
and experiential world reveals that Husserl thematizes this problem in two distinguished ways, the one 
has the transcendental phenomenolog y as background, the other the phenomenological psycholog y. My 
paper aims at an explication of these two different ways of how Husserl deals with the relationship 
between subject and the world and explores the possibility of an lifeworld discourse that looses itself from 
the transcendental bond.
I. Husserl on Lifeworld
In the modern age the natural science developed in a way that no science 
can compare with. Its methodology is widely recognized and imitated. The 
pursuit of knowledge in natural science is based on the belief that its object of 
inquiry is the nature in objective reality. The objectivity of the nature signifies 
that it is free from the impact of human being. As long as it has nothing to do 
with the human experiences, the human perception of nature plays herein no 
substantial role. It is even taken to be irrelevant in the research for objective 
knowledge. Subjectivity is entangled with relativity, which for the sake of ob-
jectivity just needs to be dispensed with. In general, in the division of scientific 
researches, the objectivity of nature belongs to the subject matter of natural sci-
ences, whereas the aspect of subjectivity is ascribed to psychology, which deals 
with the psychic phenomenon based on the physical nature. Since Galileo and 
Newton, natural science has made tremendous development and set up the 
model for all scientific researches. Even the old tradition of philosophy cannot 
but recognize this fact. Yet is the viewpoint that the subjectivity can only be 
seen to be relative and unworthy of being the subject matter of scientific re-
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search also justifiable? To be sure, how objective is the nature at all in view of 
its being as the object of scientific research? How is the nature to be disclosed, 
anyway? With all these questions in mind, Husserl asks more questions about 
the status of subjectivity. He wonders how to legitimate the claim that subjec-
tivity has only to do with the relativity? Is there no invariant structure in the 
human experiences of nature in spite of all varieties and differences? It is from 
here that Husserl begins his lifeworld discourse. He asks about the possibility 
of a science of lifeworld and explores the relationship between human experi-
ences in lifeworld and the objective natural sciences. In the end he brings up 
his transcendental phenomenology to help clarify all these questions.
Husserl delineates the lifeworld as “universal field of establishable 
facts”(Hua VI 141/Carr, 138).These facts are related to the individual per-
sons, such that the lifeworld is in the realm of the subjective (Reich der Subjek-
tiven)( Hua VI 114/Carr, 112). Husserl mentions that the facts recognized by 
the Congos in Africa, the Chinese farmers will not have the same validity 
for the Europeans (Hua VI 141/ Carr, 139). In such a case asks Husserl, can 
there be a core that is commonly valid to all people, no matter which culture 
or tradition they belong to? Both the traditional philosophy and the natural 
sciences in the modern age can be said to have overlooked this question. It is 
actually uneasy to thematize the lifeworld in a scientific way as long as it has 
since long been questioned whether such a science about lifeworld is possible. 
Even the legitimacy of such a questioning is bracketed. Is the experience in 
lifeworld not just subjective and therefore relative? Is it not what we need to 
dispense with in our pursuit of objective knowledge? The lifeworldly experi-
ence is shadowed by its untrustworthy subjectivity, which is undesirable in 
our demand of rigid objectivity. In pursuit of objectivity one should jump over 
the subjectivity that is inherent in the lifeworldly experience. As a result, the 
lifeworldly experience is regarded as valueless for scientific research and one 
seems to have sufficient reason to suspend it. Either traditional philosophy or 
modern science has dismissed it as a whole. However, the more it is dismissed, 
the more Husserl sees the urgency to take it up as a problem. How then does 
he approach this problem? Wherein lies the appropriate way of access to it? 
Suppose that the lifeworldly experience cannot be merely regarded as rela-
tive, through which way we can claim its universality? Are there indeed uni-
versal aspects to be worked out? In order to deal with these questions, Husserl 
suggests to introduce the epoché of objective sciences as its method (Hua VI 
138/ Carr, 135). He holds that we need to get free from the impact of natu-
ral science, which aims to work on the objectivity of nature. The purpose of 
practicing epoché is not to do away with scientific thinking. In Husserl’s eyes 
the science is not restricted to natural, objective science. Working on lifeworld 
without objective science does not mean that we give up scientific thinking 
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at all. In Husserl’s view in order to make clear the meaning of lifeworld, one 
needs a science that can handle the problematic of lifeworld correspondingly. 
As mentioned above, lifeworld is the “universal field of establishable facts”.
The question arises as regards the facts in lifeworld: do they remain the 
same after the epoché? Husserl gives a positive answer to this question be-
cause for him the aim of epoché is not to dismiss these facts, rather, it aims to 
facilitate our recognition of these facts. But does it mean that the study of the 
lifeworld lies in the collection of all kinds of facts spread all over the planet? 
Obviously not, Husserl holds that despite the differences on the surface there 
is universal structure to dig out. He deems these universal structures a prio-
ries. And it is the task of his phenomenology to depict all these a priories. Now, 
what are the universal a priories to understand substantially? First of all, Hus-
serl points out that as persons, people are living in the world, he is existent in 
the lifeworld. As such he has all kinds of lifeworldly experiences. The practical 
actions in everyday life show that people experience the world and the objects 
in the world incessantly. Though people never cease their experiences in life-
world, they seldom notice their own involvement in such kinds of experiences. 
So long as their attentions focus more on things that are relevant to their basic 
needs, vocational activities or enjoyments, they fail to thematize the world as a 
whole. Such awareness remains concealed unless special occasion occurs, for 
example, when they start philosophizing. Philosophy, as Husserl conceives of 
it, has paid attention to such a thematization from beginning on. He claims 
that in the seventh century before Christ the philosophy was born in Greece. 
This counts as unique event in the whole development of human history. The 
philosophers thematize the world rather than just living in the world like the 
ordinary people through theoretical attitude. They are highly motivated in 
this attitude to know what the world is rather than just being involved with it. 
In this way, the philosophy made great contributions to the human culture as 
a whole. It constitutes a breakthrough in the human history. From then on, 
not only the philosophy was born, so was the science in the narrower sense, 
that is, the discipline that is separate from philosophy. This special event has 
evolved to become one of the essential characteristics of European or Western 
culture (Hua VI 325/Carr, 279).
Even though the philosophy in ancient Greece was interested in the ques-
tion about what the world is, he sees that the main trend of traditional philoso-
phy, particularly the traditional metaphysics became more and more objectiv-
istic with the culmination in the modern age as the natural sciences emerged1. 
The objectivistic tendency leads to the consequence that the question regard-
1  Husserl calls the natural science as the residuum of  the metaphysics (Hua VI 232/ Carr, 229).
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ing the relationship between human experience and the world as experienced 
remains concealed first by the traditional metaphysics and then the natural 
science in the modern age. In view of this, Husserl regrets quite a lot about the 
unthematization of the realm of the subjective in scientific research (Hua VI 
114/Carr, 112). The subjective experience is commonly relegated to merely 
relative and becomes valueless in the eyes of natural scientists who claim to 
pursue the objective truth in nature. For this reason Husserl aims to work out 
a science of lifeworld and suggests to practice the epoché of objective sciences 
as first step. On such a basis Husserl develops what he names “ontology of the 
lifeworld”(Ontologie der Lebenswelt)2 in order to work out the aprioric, universal 
structures (Hua VI 145/Carr, 142). To make clear such a universal structure 
is to depict how the world is experienced by subjects in a flow of experiences.
The life in the lifeworld is a “life within a universal unthematic horizon”(Hua 
VI 148/Carr, 145). That means, in the lifeworld, the subjective manifold (das 
mannig faltige Subjektive) has been in function, though in a concealed manner 
(Hua VI 149/Carr, 146). Thus, to make clear how the subject and world are 
correlated to each other would become the task of the ontology of lifeworld. 
Such a correlation is aprioric and universal. According to such a conception, 
the manner in which an object is revealed is also the manner how a subject 
is revealed. In a word, the world is correlated to the subjective consciousness. 
Though the world and objects can be displayed in a variety of ways, yet the 
correlation between the world/objects and the subjective consciousness is uni-
versal and aprioric. Husserl acknowledges such an essential fact and takes it to 
be the task for the ontology of lifeworld.
In this context another question arises as regards the ontology of lifeworld:
How is the ontology of lifeworld related to the transcendental pheno- 
menology? The answer to this question will concern how Husserl conceives 
of subject. The subject that is correlated to the world is a subject in the 
world. Despite its status as  subject, it can be just objectified. It has dou-
ble aspects of subject and object, which seems to be paradoxical (Hua VI 
§53). Suppose that the human being is nothing but an object, then we may 
explain how the worldly experience proceeds, how the aprioric structures 
of lifeworld functions without having to think of how the thematization of 
lifeworld is made possible. It is exactly in consideration of such a problem-
atic that Husserl introduces his transcendental phenomenology following 
the ontology of lifeworld.
Husserl in his transcendental phenomenology works on the ultimate 
foundation of philosophy. In this way he intends to provide philosophy with 
2  David Carr translates it as “life-world ontology”(Carr, 142).
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a way to overcome the antitheses of all kinds—subjectivism vs. objectivism, 
empiricism vs. rationalism, absolutism vs. relativism, ontologism vs. tran-
scendentalism, positivism vs. metaphysics etc. (Hua IX, 300/McCormick 
eds., 34). In Husserl’s conception phenomenology in its complete form is 
no other than universal philosophy, which is a rigorous science that results 
from radical self-reflection. Only transcendental phenomenology is legiti-
mate to fulfill this requirement. And it is in this sense that Husserl regards 
the “ultimate and highest” problems as phenomenological problems. So 
explains he:
In its universal relatedness-back-to-itself, phenomenology recognizes its par-
ticular function within a possible life of  mankind at the transcendental level 
(Hua IX, 299/McCormick eds., 33).
With this in mind, Husserl holds that the ontology of lifeworld has to be 
transformed into transcendental phenomenology if one wants to work out a 
science about lifeworld in the full sense. And Husserl makes it very clear that 
the motivation behind his thematization of lifeworld is for the sake of intro-
ducing transcendental phenomenology. However, it is exactly here that we 
need to ask the following questions:
1. Has Husserl only make use of lifeworld for another purpose instead of tak-
ing seriously the theme of lifeworld? As a result, one might wonder how his 
treatment of lifeworld is corresponding to the thematization of lifeworld in 
the full sense?
2. Can the ontology of lifeworld get hold of an independent status, that is, can 
it have its own value without referring to transcendental phenomenology?
3. If it is reasonable to distinguish two sorts of the ontology of lifeworld and 
argue for the independence of the ontology of lifeworld successfully, then 
what impact does it have on Husserl’s discourse on Europe, which he dis-
plays over and over again in his late philosophy, particularly in his Vienna 
Lecture in 1935?
In what follows, I would like to focus on the second question by invoking 
the “Lecture Summer Semester 1925: Phenomenological Psychology”3.
3  Together with “Article for the Encyclopedia Britannica (1927)”, “Amsterdam Lectures (1929)” this 
lecture is included in the Husserliana Band IX. 
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2. Phenomenological Psychology 
Husserl’s phenomenological psychology touches on the natural world-concept 
(natürliche Weltbegriff ) (Hua IX, 93/Scanlon, 70), the universal science of the 
world (universale Weltwissenschaft) (Hua IX, 92/Scanlon, 69) and the correlation 
of our experiences and the world. In phenomenological psychology Husserl 
lays foundation to the factual sciences with help of the concept of experiential 
world. 
Husserl uses the term psychological phenomenology or phenomenological 
psychology alternatively, I myself prefer the former term than the latter, be-
cause the empirical psychologists have taken it for granted that the phenom-
enological psychology is a qualitative methodology for the empirical study in 
psychology as a specific science, yet Husserl makes it very clear, that phenom-
enological psychology is more embracing than psychology, that is, it is related 
to all socio-cultural sciences (Geisteswissenschaften), even all sorts of sciences. 
Husserl points out that as long as all the socio-cultural sciences are related to 
the mental (das Geistige), they all can be seen to belong to psychology (Hua IX, 
221/Scanlon, 169). In this sense, psychology is treated as the universal science 
of the mental (universale Wissenschaft vom Geistigen)  (Hua IX, 91/Scanlon, 68).
Husserl on the one hand determines the psychological phenomenology or 
phenomenological psychology as pre-stage or propaedeutic to transcendental 
phenomenology, yet on the other hand he also underlines that the former is par-
allel to the latter. Because the transcendental phenomenology is extremely alien 
to the people of common sense, Husserl regards the phenomenological psychol-
ogy as helpful device to ascend to transcendental phenomenology. With help 
of phenomenological psychology one might get familiar with phenomenology 
step by step and then becomes well-prepared to go upwards to transcendental 
phenomenology (Hua IX, 296/McCormick eds., 31-32). The final step requires 
a “mere reversal of its doctrinal content” (Hua IX, 296/McCormick eds., 32), 
which concerns the change in attitude. To which Husserl explains:
While the psychologist, operating within what for him is naturally accepted 
world, reduces to pure psychic subjectivity the subjectivity occurring there (but 
still within the world), the transcendental phenomenologist, through his ab-
solutely all-embracing epoché, reduces this psychologically pure element to 
transcendental pure subjectivity (Hua IX, 293/McCormick eds., 30).
Concretely speaking, it concerns the apperception of the world (Weltapper-
zeption) and its transformation. The psychologists, be they empirical psycholo-
gists or phenomenological psychologists, never stop their reliance on such ap-
perceptions, so are the pure psychic subjectivities (Hua IX, 340-341/Sheehan 
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eds. 246).The apperception of the world includes not only the apperception of 
objects, but also that of themselves, through which the personal ego (Mensch-
Ich) is constituted. This kind of ego is that which is objectified in the world. 
All this requires a Copernican turn in order to get to the transcendental level 
(Hua IX, 341/Sheehan eds. 248). The transcendental pure subjectivity posits 
within itself the validity of such apperception. The process of such a trans-
forming process delineates Husserl as follows:
They are transmuted into my transcendental mental process if  through a radi-
cal epoché I posit as mere phenomena of  the world, including my own human 
existence, and now follow up the intentional life-process wherein the entire 
apperception ‘of ’ the world, and in particular the apperception of  my mind, 
my psychologically real perception-process, and so forth, are formed (Hua IX, 
293/McCormick eds., 30).
The contents of these processes are preserved. That is, all that is included 
in the mental process of pure psychic subjectivity are preserved in the tran-
scendental pure subjectivity; and all these contents become “transcendentally 
inner experience”. As a result, this new kind of transcendental field of being is 
parallel to the purely psychic one. 
Husserl contends that there are not two separate egos (i.e. the personal 
ego and the transcendental ego), but the same ego functioning in different 
attitudes. In view of contents they are parallel to each other, only in regard 
to attitude, the one is mundane and the other transcendental. Because of this 
parallel «the field of transcendental self-experience…can, through mere al-
teration of attitude, be changed into psychological self-experience » (Hua IX, 
294/McCormick eds., 31).
What this signifies is that, conversely, whatever is the result of research in 
the transcendental field, there is the possibility to apply such a result to the 
mundane level. And whenever one is well acquainted with the practice of phe-
nomenological psychological reduction and consequently knows the psychic 
subjectivity well enough, one is ready for the transcendental reduction and get 
to know the transcendental pure subjectivity. 
Here we notice that Husserl distinguishes two different kinds of reduction: 
the phenomenological psychological and the transcendental. This distinction 
is first introduced in First Philosophy (1923/24), yet not made completely clear 
until in the articles concerning the phenomenological psychology such as En-
cyclopedia Britannica Article in 1927, Amsterdam Lectures in 1929 and finally Part 
Three of Crisis in 1936.
Generally speaking, Husserl localizes phenomenological psychology be-
tween the empirical psychology and transcendental phenomenology. Yet as 
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mentioned above, he also renders it as the central science to all socio-cultural 
sciences. In addition, it is also universal science for all empirical studies on 
human phenomenon because of its aprioristic characters (Hua IX, 127, 128/
Scanlon, 96, 97). It is very close to transcendental phenomenology, but it re-
mains positive science because it is confined to the natural attitude. In view 
of all these characteristics of this discipline, one may see its role as bridge 
between the transcendental phenomenology and empirical researches, but it 
also involves the seeming contradictions as well. It is eidetic as well as positive 
science, it practices epoché to get access to the purity of the psychic subjectiv-
ity, but it also retains the presupposition of the world. If we follow Husserl to 
see how he talks about the duplicity of human being – he is at the same time 
the person living in the world and the transcendental ego for the validity of 
the world (Hua IX, 294/McCormick ed., 31; see also Hua VI, §53), then the 
psychological phenomenology can be seen to best reflect such duplicity in 
regard to the status of the world. Husserl on the one hand dispenses with the 
presupposition of the world through reduction and on the other hand insists 
that the world has never been completely dispensed with due to its connection 
to natural attitude, which is opposed to transcendental attitude evidently.
In Husserl’s conception, psychology should not be only restricted to the em-
pirical psychology. Psychology can be also understood as that which aims at the 
study of the essential part of psychic phenomenon—the intentionality. In this 
sense, phenomenological psychology is an aprioric, eidetic, intuitive, and purely 
descriptive field of investigation. The objects of such a psychology are the con-
sciousness-life (Bewußtseinsleben) of the individual subject, subjects or communi-
ties of subjects in the world (Hua XXVII, 213-214; Hua IX, 335; Hua XV, 142).
In order for the investigations to be made possible, the phenomenological 
psychologists need to practice reduction such that they may become “the non-
participating onlooker” (der unbeteiligte Zuschauer) (Hua IX, 313/Sheehan eds., 
222) and become aware of the consciousness-life of the research objects. They 
need to give up all that they hold on in the natural attitude and do their best to 
get access to the purity of the psychic subjectivity and describe the essence of it 
(Hua IX, 312/Sheehan eds., 222). They also need to dispense with the world 
and what remains is all kind of being conscious of, for example, perception 
of, remembering of, judging of etc. (Hua IX, 282/McCormick, 24). With all 
these practices they become different from the objects they investigate. The 
purity of the psychic phenomenon, secured by “psychological-phenomeno-
logical reduction”, means mainly liberation from the psycho-physical aspects 
of psychic phenomenon (Hua IX, 308/Sheehan eds., 218). The reduction de-
mands that whatever irrelevant to the essential part of the psychic needs to be 
bracketed. The investigators concentrate solely on the correlation between the 
psychic activities and their intentional objects. 
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As indicated above, the objects that the psychological phenomenology 
aims to study are the individual subject, subjects or communities of subjects 
in the world. The subjects of these sorts are deeply involved in the world, so 
deeply that without the correlative part of the world, the psychic phenomenon 
of the subject(s) can be hardly explained. In this sense, the investigation has to 
presuppose the world. And this results in contradiction regarding the status 
of the world, i.e. on the one hand the world is bracketed through the practice 
of reduction, it is on the other hand retained for the sake of research so long 
as the objects they investigate are deeply involved in the world. In transcen-
dental phenomenology such a contradiction is overcome because the world as 
a whole has turned into phenomena. Consequently the reduction practiced 
by the psychologists is so to speak incomplete compared to philosophers and 
consequently the purity attained therein has also only relative purity (Hua 
IX, 225/Scanlon, 172).
3. Phenomenological Psychology and the Experiential World
Nevertheless one should never denounce the value of phenomenological psy-
chology in view of such contradiction. As long as this discipline works on the 
liberation from the “transcendent factors,” that is, the psycho-physical aspects 
of the psychic phenomenon, it gets hold of the basis to work out the essence of 
psychic phenomenon. And this leads to the study of the “unitary experiential 
world” (einheitliche Erfahrungswelt), which is “all-inclusive world for natural sci-
ences and socio-cultural sciences” (Hua IX, 232/Scanlon, 178). 
All the socio-cultural sciences need to deal with what proceed in the men-
tal (das Geistige) of the people, what they think and how they think. But as long 
as the  human beings are living in the world, the worldly aspect just requires 
to be taken into consideration. Traditionally, the relation between material 
nature and the mental has concerned the philosophers and scientists since 
Descartes in the early 17th century. Though Husserl poses similar question, 
yet he declines to see either “nature” or “mind” as indubitable notions from 
which we can start dealing with this question. As a matter of fact, these two 
concepts result from our theoretical thinking instead of our original experi-
ence. As long as the concepts of “nature” and “mind” are results of theoretical 
interests, they should not be taken for granted in such a context.
The world revealed through pre-theoretical experiences is never the world-
in-itself, i.e. the pure material nature, it is instead related to the subject. Hus-
serl delineates such a world as surrounding world (Umwelt). This is a pre-sci-
entific, pre-theoretic world of experience that involves the subjective aspect. 
Even though every subjective experience has its particular, concrete content, 
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it nevertheless contains the stable sense ( fester Sinn), that is, the invariant (das 
Invariante) in the world (Hua IX, 225/Scanlon, 172). The phenomenological 
psychology of Husserl aims at exactly the clarification of such invariants in 
the world. So long as it is related to the subjective moments, it is not devoid 
of the mental or mind. Besides, one has to add that the subject is closely con-
nected to the world. It is “subject in the world”. How, then, is such a subject 
to understand? 
The subject is a being with the mental, with mind, yet it is not purely men-
tal, it is also a being with bodily existence. The subject is involved in space, 
closely related to the physical phenomenon and material nature. How then is 
such a connection to be explained? Husserl takes up this old question with a 
new orientation. 
Basically, Husserl holds the view that the mental is more essential than the 
body in the definition of human being. However, to the extent that the mental 
cannot exist on its own, the mind is not irrelevant to the space. The mind is 
involved with space through the body, with such involvement the mind can 
be said to localize in space, though mediately. Husserl regards this as the 
way how the mind is originally given in space. When we determine that the 
mental cannot exist without the physical subsistence, the latter can be said 
to constitute the presupposition for the former. As a result, when the body 
is annihilated, so is the mental or mind. This is how Husserl thinks of death 
as a real event in the world (Hua IX, 109/Scanlon, 82). Accordingly Husserl 
does not support the idea that the soul may survive the decay of the body. He 
insists on the necessary precondition of the bodily existence for the mental. 
However, he is not in accordance with the naturalistic view that the mental 
or mind can be treated as no more than the by-product of the physical body, 
either. It is unacceptable to him to study the mental or mind with the devices 
borrowed from natural sciences. For him this sort of approach makes up the 
biggest obstacle to understand the mental or mind. He explains:
In a completely one-sided fashion, one attempted always to continue proceed-
ing exclusively in the mode of  natural science and to reduce all research con-
cerning reality to inductive research. Inductive science and empirical science 
fact stood and still now stand for many as equivalent expressions. Connected 
with that is the unclear transfer, one which is as a rule even false in principle, 
of  the idea of  a science of  nature to the science of  mental essences and of  the 
psyche itself  (Hua IX, 142/Scanlon, 108). 
In the eyes of the natural scientists the mental or mind is nothing but the 
phenomenon that is based on the physical occurrences. The mental is thus 
interpreted as objectified phenomenon in the natural world. The human be-
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ing is normally conceptualized as such, and the ego is basically regarded as 
spatial existence. But Husserl rejects such a conception of the ego. In his eyes, 
the pure ego is far beyond what the bodily phenomenon reveals4.
Husserl reinterprets the traditional philosophical question of mind/body 
by inquiring: how the mind comes to be involved in the spatial world? The 
answer to this question lies in animation (Beseelung), which can be made clear 
against the background of what Husserl calls the personalistic attitude.
As the subject in the world the human being deals with the things in the 
surrounding world with a attitude that Husserl calls the personalistic attitude. 
This attitude signifies the interest in the meaning and value of the things. 
And in this attitude, «my body is … given for me in the surrounding world as 
the center of the rest of the surrounding world, as a spatial thing of the sur-
rounding world with somatic properties, in which I hold sway, and even as 
that by which I exercise an influence upon the rest of the surrounding world, 
etc.» (Hua IX, 228/Scanlon, 175). This attitude is definitely different from the 
naturalistic attitude, which has exclusively interest in the pure nature that is 
deprived of value and meaning. For Husserl the surrounding world is related 
to the personalistic attitude and the pure nature results from the privation of 
personalistic attitude. 
Originally, the world is never independent of our experiences, the items we 
encounter are never just natural material, but always involving some senses 
beyond pure nature, not to mention the persons we encounter. As personal I 
(Mensch-Ich) I am living in the world with all these things and other persons. 
And it is the socio-cultural science that deals with the personal subject living 
in his surrounding, cultural world (Hua XXVII, 211). In such a situation, 
the things around him are significant (bedeutsam) (Hua IX, 111; Scanlon, 84). 
Husserl even notifies that between the personal subject and his objects there 
is intertwining relationship (Hua IX, 226; Scanlon, 173). In brief, cultural 
objects are produced for the sake of some uses or purposes that constitute their 
meaning and value. 
The knowledge about the pure nature is not at all equal to the understand-
ing of the world. The things in the surrounding world are things full of mean-
ing and value, they are cultural objects. Although the cultural objects have the 
components of natural material, they are not merely natural objects. Husserl 
holds that « (t)he purpose and sense of the work which accrued to the object in 
its original production is something permanently appropriated to that mate-
rial object » (Hua IX, 115/Scanlon, 87). The value and meaning are adherent 
4  As long as the pure ego is the origin of  constitution, the body can even be said to be consti-
tuted by the pure ego (208).
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to the cultural objects as their inseparable parts. Taking up arrow as example, 
Husserl explicates:  
physically the arrow is sensually seen and is at the same time, as we say, un-
derstood in its final sense as an arrow. It shows itself  to be that in possible 
and actual experience whenever it is shown and demonstrated as having been 
produced for the sake of  this sense and as corresponding to it (Hua IX, 115/
Scanlon, 87). 
Seen as such, the eidetic description of the personalistic attitude can pro-
vide us with an appropriate approach to understand the world. A study of this 
world calls Husserl also as «the eidetic study of the world of natural experi-
ence» (die Eidetik der natürlichen Erfahrungswelt). As long as this science aims at 
describing the a priori of the experiential world, it is close to the aforemen-
tioned phenomenological psychology and universal science of the world (uni-
versale Weltwissenschaft). 
Phenomenological psychology, the universal science of the world, or 
«the eidetic study of the world of natural experience», all of them are to 
be characterized as aprioric, eidetic, intuitive, descriptive and intentional. 
Beyond that it remains in the natural attitude instead of transcendental 
attitude. A priori implies that between subject and the world there is a uni-
versal structure, which is revealed through constant styles and types. Such 
aprioric, universal structures are presuppositions of the daily life. Yet these 
presuppositions are not being aware of. Even the subject that is involved is 
not being aware of, either. In daily life people have their preoccupations 
with all kinds of object that concern their living. One needs to step back in 
order to get in touch with these presuppositions as well as the subject that 
has been constantly in function. It is what Husserl means by reduction. 
First is the stage of psychological-phenomenological reduction, and then 
the transcendental-phenomenological reduction.  In this context, the first 
one will suffice.
Through the reduction we become aware of the presupposition of daily life 
and come in touch with the experiential world, which Husserl explains:
By the title ‘experiential world’ we mean clearly what makes up the unity of  
concordant total actuality which is continually reestablished in the course of  
our experiences (Hua IX, 59/Scanlon, 44).
The world is a world that is related to the subject, not just the world-in-it-
self, as already mentioned before. And such experiential world has a universal 
structure that is revealed in stable types and styles. The structure is on the one 
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hand related to the subject, it is on the other related to the world. The subject 
and the world are just correlated to each other. 
Husserl points out further that the experiential world with its eidetic structure 
is the «all-inclusive world for natural sciences and socio-cultural sciences»(Hua 
IX, 232/Scanlon, 178). It contains the world-truth (Weltwahrheit) (Hua IX, 63/
Scanlon 47) that constitutes the basis for all the truths in factual sciences, be it 
natural or socio-cultural. The truth revealed in the world of original experienc-
es signifies that such a world of truth is not a world without contents. Only be-
cause of its fruitful contents can it become the foundation of all sciences. Based 
on the truth of such a world we can be sure of truth in scientific knowledge. The 
world is a domain of pre-scientific experience, the structures of which will be 
reflected in other sciences (Hua IX, 64, 46, 232/Scanlon, 33, 47, 178).
Thus, the experiential world is the foundation of all the scientific research-
es. The experience has it that, as human beings living in the natural attitude, 
we hold lots of unshakable believes which concern the reality and totality 
of the world. It is accepted by us as firmly as possible. But that which is re-
vealed in the original experiences is for Husserl much too contaminated by 
the scientific culture that we may find it extremely hard to return to the world 
in original experiences and recognize it. For this reason Husserl suggests to 
overcome such difficulties by phenomenological reduction, here once again 
the psychological-phenomenological reduction.
Conclusion
In the first part of my paper, I delineate the Husserlian notion of lifeworld 
ending with the question: Can the ontology of lifeworld get hold of an inde-
pendent status, that is, can it have its own value without referring to transcen-
dental phenomenology?
In the second and third part of my paper I explore the meaning of phe-
nomenological psychology by indicating the position of this discipline as be-
tween transcendental phenomenology and empirical psychology. In addition, 
I also indicate the parallel between phenomenological psychology and tran-
scendental phenomenology. Husserl himself handles the relationship between 
phenomenological psychology and transcendental phenomenology quite a lot 
when he deals with phenomenological psychology. However, in the lecture 
held in 1925, we hardly find Husserl articulate much about the relationship 
between phenomenological psychology and transcendental phenomenology, 
rather, it concentrates on the relationship between phenomenological psychol-
ogy and the factual sciences, in particular that of socio-cultural sciences in the 
context of which the experiential world plays a pivotal role. 
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As long as phenomenological psychology works on the correlation of our ex-
periences and the world, and as long as it deals with the natural world-concept, 
the phenomenological psychology corresponds to the universal science of the 
world. If, as the mind’s self-knowledge (193/Scanlon, 148), the phenomenologi-
cal psychology focuses on the side of subject, then it is the universal science of 
the world that focuses on the side of the world. Like two sides of the same coin, 
these two sciences belong to each other and both of them correspond to « the 
eidetic study of the world of natural experience» as long as they are eidetic sci-
ences. In such a case, a phenomenology without the subsoil of transcendental 
phenomenology seems sustainable. Looking back to the question raised above, 
why not also grant the ontology of lifeworld an independent status?
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